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Abstract
This paper sheds light on the role of student motivation in the success of schooling.
We develop a model in which a teacher engages in the management of student moti-
vation through the choice of the classroom environment. We show that the teacher is
able to motivate high-ability students, at least in the short run, by designing a com-
petitive environment. For students with low ability, risk aversion, or when engaged
in a long-term relationship, the teacher designs a classroom environment that is more
focused on mastery and self-referenced standards. In doing so, the teacher helps to
develop the intrinsic motivation of students and their capacity to overcome failures.
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“There are three things to remember about education. The first is motivation. The
second is motivation. The third is motivation.” Terrel Bell, former Secretary of
Education, the Reagan Administration.
1 Introduction
Most schools suffer from widely recognized gaps between their mandates - the high academic
and social achievement of their students - and their performance. To a large extent, these
gaps can be explained by what is often mentioned as the most important problem in edu-
cation: A lack of student effort. Education economists have thus far explained the under
provision of effort by students’ myopic behavior, cognitive problems, as well as some adverse
effects of different institutional factors such as the type of grading system and the level of
educational standards.1 What is often ignored in this literature, however, is what educa-
tional psychologists consider to be the primary determinant of students’ effort, i.e. their
motivation (see for example Wigfield, Eccles, Roeser, Schiefele, 2009). Educational psychol-
ogists regard motivation, defined as the force that moves students to do something, as a
complex and multifaceted object to analyze. Motivation is mainly affected by four factors:
the extrinsic valuation of students for the task to achieve, their intrinsic interest for learning,
their self-concept of ability and their perception of control. A further complication is that
these factors evolve over time and are context dependent. They change with students’ vari-
ous stages of development and previous academic performances. Educational psychologists
also insist that teachers can alter motivational factors by designing the classroom environ-
ment (Ames, 1992). By promoting a competitive environment, a teacher helps to develop
students’ extrinsic valuing of achievement; by emphasizing the importance of understanding
and mastering, the teacher reinforces students’ intrinsic interest for learning.
We develop a model in this article to explore students’ motivation and to study how
teachers should engage in its management by choosing the classroom environment that best
1We review the economic literature below.
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matches students’ motivational patterns. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first
theoretical economic analysis of the interplay between the classroom environment, student
motivation and achievement. We first study the management of motivation over the short
run: For given characteristics of the students, what is the best way for a teacher to help
them accomplish success? We next study the management of motivation over the long run:
How can the teacher design a classroom environment to maintain students’ motivation, most
notably if they experience failure? To answer these questions, we use a principal-agent frame-
work in which the agent (student) is endowed with both an extrinsic and intrinsic source of
utility. To further incorporate the psychological context, we rely on the achievement goal
theory emanating from educational psychology (Nicholls, 1984; Dweck, 1986; Ames, 1992).
This theory explains students’ motivation in terms of goals they hold when they engage in
an academic task. Goals can be understood as a student’s subjective representation of the
purposes of the task, the way success is defined, and the role of effort and ability in achieve-
ment. They are posited to influence achievement through their impact on study strategies.
The achievement goal literature considers three types of goals that can coexist within the
same individual (Elliot, 1999): Students with a mastery goal focus on learning and under-
standing, developing new skills, and achieving a sense of mastery based on self-referenced
standards. Central to this orientation is the student’s belief that effort leads to mastery,
and hence contentment. Students with a performance goal focus on the demonstration of
academic talent; they want to obtain high grades or outperform other students. They hold
the belief that performance strongly depends on ability. Students with an avoidance goal
want to avoid exhibiting any incompetence in order to preserve their self-confidence. They
tend to withdraw from challenging tasks, and not participate in classroom activities.
The teacher influences the personal goals adopted by the students through the choice of
the classroom environment. A mastery goal structure refers to pedagogical practices that
emphasize learning, understanding and personal improvement. A performance goal structure
refers to practices which emphasize competition, grades, and rankings. The two previous
structures can be seen as opposite ends of a continuum. A structure between these two
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extremes is referred to as a multiple goal structure.
A considerable amount of evidence reveals that the goals adopted by a student shape
their study behavior and academic achievements (see Anderman and Wolters (2006) for an
overview). Mastery goals generate adaptive study behaviors such as effort, deep processing
of the learning material, task enjoyment and persistence in the face of difficulties or failure.
These goals favor a long-term investment in learning. Interestingly, the positive outcomes
seem to appear regardless of the ability of the student (Elliot and Dweck, 1988). Neverthe-
less, empirical studies do not establish a direct link between mastery goals and academic
achievement. This puzzling result has been explained by the fact that exams consist of
multiple choice questionnaires, which may favor surface over deep learning. An alternative
explanation states that mastery-oriented students pursue their own learning agenda and
spend quite a bit of time on personally interesting material not relevant for the test (Senko
and Miles, 2008). Performance goals generate effort and surface learning, and favor academic
achievement, particularly for high-ability students. The positive relationship between per-
formance goals and grades has been explained by the fact that students with performance
goals seek to align their learning agenda with that of the teacher by carefully trying to iden-
tify the assessment criteria. Even so, several researchers have suggested that performance
goals could also damage students’ self-concept of ability when working hard does not lead
to success (Covington and Omelich, 1979; Skaalvik, 1997). As a result, it could be more
difficult for performance-goal students to preserve their level of engagement over the long
run. Finally, avoidance goals are generally regarded as undesirable, and are related to poor
educational outcomes such as self-handicapping behaviors, low effort and low grades.2
Not surprisingly, educational psychologists generally favor mastery goals or multiple goals
as the best way to induce constructive behaviors for a wide range of students. In contrast,
education economists have relied more on students’ reason than emotions, thereby neglecting
essential motivational factors. The main objective of this paper is to study whether educa-
2Self handicapping refers to a choice that prevents a student from feeling responsible for failure such as
partying the night before an exam.
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tion economics can learn from the lessons of educational psychology to better understand
students’ motivation.
To accomplish this, we develop a framework with two agents: a teacher and a represen-
tative student with a learning task to achieve. The student is endowed with an exogenous
ability and initial goal orientation. The teacher chooses a classroom structure that can be
more or less performance or mastery oriented. The student observes the structure chosen by
the teacher, modifies its goal orientation, and exerts effort. There is a test at the end of the
period to verify whether the learning task has been successfully accomplished. The grade is
an increasing function of the student’s ability and effort. We make two assumptions which
structure the model:
• The teacher acts in a test-based accountability environment, and internalizes this en-
vironment by choosing a classroom structure that maximizes the student’s grade.
• A classroom structure more oriented towards performance goals causes the student to
align his or her learning agenda with that of the teacher. Ceteris paribus, this increases
the efficiency of effort, thereby making it easier for the student to succeed in the test.
An interesting feature of the model is that despite these two “procompetitive” assump-
tions, promoting a mastery-oriented goal structure will nevertheless be the optimal policy for
the teacher in many different circumstances. We first consider a static framework in which
the student is only endowed with two goals: performance and mastery. Consistently with the
findings of goal-theory literature, we show that choosing a mastery-oriented goal structure
permits the teacher to induce a level of student effort independent of ability: by focusing
on mastery, the teacher avoids relying too strongly on the ability-performance connection
related to a pure performance goal. The consequence of this is that the teacher chooses a
mastery-oriented classroom structure for low- or intermediate-ability students. For a high-
ability student, the teacher chooses a performance goal structure. In doing so, the teacher
induces an efficient effort and thus a high grade.
We consider three variants of the static model. In the first variant, we assume that
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the student can obtain an exogenous level of utility by choosing not to exert any effort,
which corresponds to introducing an avoidance goal for the student. The introduction of
the participation constraint causes the teacher to choose a structure more oriented towards
mastery goals if the student’s ability is not too high. In our framework, the teacher’s unique
objective is to maximize the test result so that the teacher chooses a structure that is too
performance-oriented compared to the student’s aspirations. To prevent the student from
adopting the avoidance goal, the teacher must align his or her objectives more closely with
those of the student by increasing the mastery goal structure. In the second variant, we
study the case in which the student is risk adverse. Risk aversion signifies that the student
dislikes not having complete control over the test result. We show that for a given classroom
structure, a higher risk aversion causes a student with a low or intermediate ability to exert
less effort in order to reduce the variance of the outcome, even if the probability to fail
the test increases. At equilibrium, the teacher chooses a structure more oriented towards
mastery goals than under risk neutrality. By doing so, the teacher favors the student’s
intrinsic motivation, which is not affected by the risk, thus remotivating effort. In the third
variant, we introduce a cost difference between the different classroom structures.
The choice of the classroom structure also affects the way a student reacts if he or she fails
the test. To study the management of student motivation over the long run, we introduce
a dynamic (two-period) version of the model. We suppose that failing the test in the first
period negatively affects the probability of succeeding in the second period. We also assume
that failing reduces the student’s intrinsic interest for the task, unless the teacher has initially
chosen a classroom structure sufficiently oriented towards mastery goals. We show that if
the teacher is sufficiently patient, a mastery-oriented structure is chosen in the first period,
even if it makes the student a bit less successful in this period. In doing so, the teacher is
able to keep the student on track in the second period, even after a failure.
This article proceeds as follows: Section 2 yields an overview of the related economic
literature. Section 3 presents the static framework, whereas section 4 presents the dynamic
version. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Related Literature
This article relates to the new microeconomics of education that considers students’ effort as
the most important input to education production. This literature studies strategic interac-
tions between teachers and students. For example, Correa and Gruver (1987) and De Fraja
et al. (2010) consider the case in which effort levels provided by the various participants
in the education process are strategic substitutes. Bishop (1994) relates the classroom to a
classic prisoner dilemma situation in which students pressure each other not to study because
of being graded on a curve (i.e. a relative grading system) while teachers are pressured to
pass students in order to keep failure rates low. In an empirical study, Bonesrønning (2004)
shows that hard grading leads to improved achievements. However, he argues that hard
grading is less likely to occur in an environment with a competition among schools. Akerlof
and Kranton (2002) focus on how students care about their social position in school, and
how they try to fit in with their peers. They state that it is rational for students such as
“burnouts” to provide a low effort when this corresponds to the ideal amount of their social
identity group.
Much of the existing literature focuses on the level of effort rather than on the source or
the efficiency of effort. In addition, the effort-performance relationship is static and does not
vary after a failure. Our model attempts to capture these elements: We study how different
types of motivation stem from the goal orientation of the student and affect the level and
efficiency of effort. We also take into account that students might feel incompetent after a
failure.
This article further relates to the literature on accountability systems and educational
standards. Even though these recent reforms have been anticipated to ensure that all stu-
dents - regardless of any existing disadvantage - benefit from significant achievement gains in
school, the results have been mixed: beside their positive effects, higher standards may also
discourage the marginal student who finds it better to drop out of school (Costrell, 1994;
Betts, 1998). The same goes for test-based accountability systems which are put in place as
an attempt to extract more effort from teachers. Nonetheless, they may trigger teachers to
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game the system and induce a change in the way teachers distribute their effort among stu-
dents of different abilities (Hanushek and Raymond, 2002; Neal and Schanzenbach, 2010).3
Therefore, accountability systems often increase the scores among students in the middle of
the achievement distribution but not among the least academically advantaged students.
Our model states that a sufficiently patient teacher can succeed in motivating low-ability
students, therefore establishing a sound accountability. This stands in sharp contrast to
short-term strategies such as preemptively retaining students from taking the test or substi-
tuting away from low-stakes subjects.
This article is also associated with the literature developed by psychologists and pur-
sued by economists dealing with intrinsic motivation. For over three decades, researchers
in psychology have debated as to whether external incentive programs inhibit the agent’s
intrinsic motivation and performance, which is a phenomenon referred to as the crowding
out effect (Fehr and Falk 2008; Frey and Jegen, 2001; Ryan and Deci, 2000). For a long time,
economists have primarily considered the positive relationship between external incentives
and outcomes. Recently, however, researchers in contract theory have studied how contracts
should be modified in order to take both explicit and implicit incentives into account (Kreps,
1997; Be´nabou and Tirole, 2003). Notably, this literature identifies conditions under which
extrinsic rewards are harmful instead of beneficial. Along these dimensions, we study how
the student’s motivational pattern depends on the choice of the principal. In our model,
however, the principal’s choice also affects the efficiency of effort.
3Teachers may for instance increase the use of special education placements, “teach for the test” and
substitute away from low-stakes subjects (Jacob, 2002).
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3 Static Management of Student Motivation
We consider a model with a teacher (she) and a representative student (he) who interact
during one period. There is complete information. First, we consider a framework in which
the student has two possible achievement goals, performance and mastery, and is risk neutral
regarding the test result. Thereafter, we extend our analysis to include an avoidance goal
before finally dealing with a risk-adverse student.
3.1 The Model with Performance and Mastery Goals
The student. He has knowledge to acquire. There is a test at the end of the period to
verify whether the knowledge has been acquired or not.4 The student can either pass or fail
the test. The student has a (cognitive) ability, θ ∈ [0, 1], and he exerts some effort e ∈ [0, 1].
Having a higher ability and/or exerting a higher effort increase the probability of passing
the test. We denote X as the random variable equal to 1 when the student is successful and
0 otherwise. The student is endowed with a goal orientation.
The teacher. She chooses a classroom structure, s ∈ [0, 1]. A low s means that the teacher
favors a mastery goal structure, while a high s means that the teacher favors a performance
goal structure. The choice of the classroom structure alters the student’s goal orientation.
We assume that the teaching costs are not affected by the choice of the classroom structure.
We will relax this assumption thereafter.
Test result. We assume that the result is equal to
X =
 1 with probability θes0 with probability 1− θes (1)
The probability of passing the test is increasing in the student’s ability, θ, and effort, e. It
is also increasing in s, i.e. when the teacher chooses a classroom structure more oriented
4We suppose throughout the paper that the test result is a perfect indicator of the acquisition of knowl-
edge.
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towards performance goals. When the teacher stresses performance, the student becomes
more attentive to her demands so that the efficiency of effort and the probability of passing
the test increase.
Payoffs. We assume the student is risk neutral. Following Kreps (1997), Akerlof and
Kranton (2002) and Be´nabou and Tirole (2003), among others, we assume that the student
has two sources of utility: extrinsic and intrinsic, which correspond to performance and
mastery goals, respectively. We use the following separable utility function:
θes+ γe(1− s)− 0.5e2 (2)
where γ ∈ [0, 2]. The first term represents the extrinsic satisfaction associated with the
task. We take it equal to the expected value of the test result, E(X). The second term
represents the intrinsic satisfaction from acquiring knowledge, i.e. the joy of learning, and is
increasing in effort. It is also decreasing in s: the student’s intrinsic satisfaction diminishes
as the teacher becomes more oriented towards a performance goal structure. Parameter γ
reflects the (relative) propensity for intrinsic motivation. When γ is equal to 0, the student
has a pure performance goal: only the extrinsic motivation matters. When γ is equal to 2,
mastery goals become the preeminent goal orientation of the student. We will show that in
this case, the student exerts the maximum level of effort even when his ability is nil. The
third term is the cost to exert effort.
The teacher is risk neutral. We assume that she acts in an accountability environment and
that her payoff is equal to the expected value of the test result, E(X).
Timing of the game.
- The teacher chooses a classroom structure, s ∈ [0, 1] .
- The student observes s and exerts effort e ∈ [0, 1].
- The student takes the test and obtains a result X.
The structure of the model is represented in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Structure of the Model
3.2 The Motivational Equilibria
We consider the maximization problem of the student for a given classroom structure s.
Solving
e∗(s) = arg max
e∈[0,1]
θes+ γe(1− s)− 0.5e2 (3)
yields
e∗(s) = min {γ + (θ − γ)s, 1} (4)
When θ > γ, the student is characterized by possessing a high ability and/or his extrinsic
interest for the task is relatively more pronounced than his intrinsic interest. In this case,
effort increases as the teacher chooses a more performance-oriented classroom structure.
When θ < γ, effort increases as the teacher chooses a more mastery-oriented classroom
structure. Note that when γ > 1, we are necessarily in the latter case.
We now consider the maximization problem of the teacher. We have
s∗ = arg max
s∈[0,1]
θse∗(s) (5)
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The solution is
s∗ =

1
2
γ
γ−θ if θ ≤ γ/2
1 if θ ≥ γ/2
(6)
The equilibrium is fully described by expressions (4) and (6). At equilibrium, the student’s
effort, e∗(s∗) is equal to γ/2 when θ ≤ γ/2 and equal to θ when θ ≥ γ/2. We sum up the
results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 At equilibrium, the teacher chooses a performance goal structure when the
student’s ability is higher than half the propensity for intrinsic motivation. Otherwise, the
teacher chooses a multiple goal structure. As a result of this, she induces an effort that is
independent of the student’s ability.
The equilibria are represented in Figure 2 and the equilibrium path and payoffs are
described in Table 1. When the ability θ is higher than the propensity for intrinsic motivation,
γ, both the effort and its efficiency increase as the teacher chooses a structure more oriented
towards performance. Thus, the teacher chooses a performance goal structure, s∗ = 1. When
θ is between γ/2 and γ, the teacher still chooses s∗ = 1. In this case, the student’s effort would
be higher if the classroom structure was more oriented towards mastery goals. However, this
mastery-induced effort would be less efficient and the probability of the student passing the
test would decrease. When θ is below γ/2, the teacher chooses a classroom structure more
oriented towards mastery goals: s∗ = γ/(2γ − 2θ). In our framework s∗ is always larger
than 1/2: A pure mastery goal structure would nullify the efficiency of the effort. In fact, at
equilibrium, the teacher chooses a multiple goal structure that combines performance and
mastery goals. In doing so, she induces an effort level e∗(s∗) = γ/2, independent of the
student’s ability θ. For the teacher, the benefit of breaking the ability-effort connection is
higher than the loss coming from the reduced efficiency of this effort. Note that the case in
which a multiple goal structure is optimal (θ ≤ γ/2) also applies to a high-ability student
when his propensity for intrinsic motivation is very pronounced (close to 2).
Our results are broadly consistent with empirical findings in educational psychology lit-
erature. Elliott and Dweck (1988) have found that performance goals enhance the effort
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Figure 2: Equilibria in the static framework
and achievement for students with high cognitive abilities. Other researchers have found
that mastery goals induce positive patterns of learning regardless of the actual or perceived
students’ ability (Nicholls, 1984; Bandura and Dweck, 1985; Elliott and Dweck 1988).
s∗ e∗(s∗) U t
∗
Up
∗
If θ ≥ γ/2 1 θ θ2 θ2
2
If θ ≤ γ/2 1
2
γ
γ−θ
γ
2
1
4
γ2θ
γ−θ
γ2
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Table 1: equilibrium payoffs
We now consider three extensions of the static model : 1) the teacher needs to take into
account a student’s participation constraint, which represents an avoidance goal; 2) the
student is risk averse; and 3) there is a cost difference between performance and mastery
classroom structures.
3.3 Extensions: Participation Constraint, Risk Aversion, and
Cost Difference
Participation constraint and avoidance goal. We assume that the student agrees to
participate only if he obtains a utility no smaller than some level U s. We interpret U s
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as the utility that the student obtains by adopting an avoidance goal, that is deliberately
deciding not to participate in classroom activities. In this case, failure is certain although the
student’s self-worth is not damaged. We take γ ≤ 1 and we assume that γ2/8 < U s ≤ γ2/2.5
For a given classroom structure s, the expression (4) of the student’s effort becomes e∗(s) =
θs + γ(1 − s). The associated student’s utility is Up = 0.5(θs + γ(1 − s))2. The teacher
maximizes the expectation of the grade, θe∗(s)s, subject to the participation constraint
Up ≥ Up.
If θ ≤ γ/2, the utility of the student in the unconstrained world, γ2/8, is below the reservation
utility, Up. Therefore, the teacher needs to align her preferences with the student’s in order
to prevent avoidance. To do so, she diminishes s∗ from the unconstrained level, 1
2
γ
γ−θ , down
to the level s∗p satisfying 0.5(θs
∗ + γ(1 − s∗))2 = Up, that is, s∗p = γ−
√
2Up
γ−θ . If γ/2 ≤
θ ≤ γ, the teacher diminishes s∗ from the unconstrained level, 1, down to the level s∗p =
min
{
1,
γ−
√
2Up
γ−θ
}
. If θ ≥ γ, the teacher chooses s∗p = 1. The associated student utility is
θ2/2, which is larger than γ2/2: The participation constraint is satisfied. The results are
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Introducing a participation constraint for the student causes the teacher to
increase the mastery goal structure when the student’s ability is low or intermediate in order
to prevent him from adopting an avoidance goal.
We compare the classroom structure both with and without the participation constraint
in Figure 3 for γ = 1 and Up = 1/4. For a given classroom structure, a small level of ability
increases the student’s inclination to adopt an avoidance behavior to preserve his self-esteem.
By increasing the mastery goal structure, the teacher in this case can develop the intrinsic
satisfaction of the student, thus keeping him away from avoidance.
5Condition Up > γ2/8 guarantees that the reservation utility is sufficiently high so that the participation
constraint will play in some cases. Condition Up ≤ γ2/2 guarantees that the avoidance goal is not too
desirable for the student. Condition γ ≤ 1 guarantees that θf + γ(1− f) is smaller than 1 for any θ and f
and permits to avoid taxonomy.
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Our result is consistent with empirical findings from the achievement goal literature.
For example, Turner, Midgley, Meyer, Gheen, Anderman, Kang, and Patrick (2002) have
observed that a mastery goal structure is negatively associated with avoidance and self-
handicapping behaviors.
Figure 3: Choice of classroom structure, with and without a participation constraint
Risk aversion and perception of control. We return to the case with no participation
constraint. We now assume that the student is risk averse whereas the teacher is still
risk neutral. We use a mean-variance framework: For a given expectation of the grade,
the student’s extrinsic satisfaction diminishes as the variance of the result increases. Risk
aversion expresses the student’s concern for having an incomplete control over the test result.
The student’s utility takes the following shape
E(X)− rV (X) + γe(1− s)− 0.5e2
where 0 ≤ r < 1 is a measure of risk aversion and V (X) = θes(1 − θes). At equilibrium,
student’s effort is
e∗r(s) = min
{
1,
θ(1− r)s+ γ(1− s)
1− 2rθ2s2
}
(7)
Interestingly, a more risk adverse student does not always provide a higher level of effort.
A sufficient condition for ∂e
∗
r
∂r
< 0 is θ <
√
2
2
: effort is a decreasing function of risk aversion
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for students with a low or intermediate ability. In fact, exerting less effort permits these
students to diminish the risk/variance, even if the probability of succeeding decreases. We
also have ∂e
∗
r
∂r
> 0 if θ >
√
2
2
and s = 1: Under a performance goal structure, high-ability
students exert more effort as risk aversion increases in order to reduce risk.6 Solving the
teacher’s maximization problem yields
s∗r = min
{
1,
γ − θ(1− r)−√(γ − θ(1− r))2 − 2rγ2θ2
2rγθ2
}
(8)
One can verify that when γ ≤ √2, we have s∗r ≤ s∗ for any θ and any r, where s∗ is given by
expression (6). The inequality is strict for low levels of ability. The student’s risk aversion
makes the teacher choose a structure more oriented toward mastery goals because she then
diminishes the importance of risk for the student, therefore eliciting more effort. The policy
s∗r is illustrated in the left part of Figure 4 for r = 1/2 and γ = 1.
When γ ≥ √2, we have s∗r < s∗ for θ < 2 γγ2+2 and any r, and s∗r ≥ s∗ for θ ≥ 2 γγ2+2
and any r. In this case, the teacher chooses a classroom structure more oriented toward
performance goals for intermediate- and high-ability levels. Putting more pressure on these
students is efficient as they then exert more effort to better control the test result. Note
that this teacher behavior is not possible when γ is smaller than
√
2, because the teacher
already has a performance structure as an optimal strategy for intermediate and high ability
students. The structure s∗r is illustrated in the right part of Figure 4 for r = 0.5 and γ = 1.8.
The results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 A higher student risk aversion makes the teacher increase the mastery goal
structure when the student’s ability is low or intermediate.
Skinner et al. (1998) show that children who believe teachers are supportive and care
about their progress develop a more positive sense of control over their outcomes. They are
6These results relate to the insurance literature on self protection in which a risk-adverse agent can
increase the probability of success by exerting a costly self-protection activity (e.g. effort). Contrary to what
intuition suggests, in this literature a more risk adverse agent does not necessarily exert more effort (Dionne
and Eeckhoudt 1985; Jullien, Salanie´ and Salanie´; 1999).
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Figure 4: Choice of classroom structure, with a risk-adverse pupil
less anxious and perform better academically. This is consistent with our prediction that
when faced with a risk-adverse student, the teacher increases the mastery goal structure to
help reduce the student’s perception of risk.
Cost differences between classroom structures. Thus far, we have assumed that
changing the classroom structure does not modify the costs related to teaching. This ex-
plains why costs do not appear in the utility function of the teacher. Nevertheless, it seems
reasonable to think that mastery oriented classroom structures require more involvement,
more attention and more effort from the teacher. In other words, it is more costly to design
an adequate mastery structure than a performance structure. We take into account the cost
difference between structures by rewriting the teacher’s objective function as θes− c(1− s)
with 0 < c ≤ γ2/8. The teaching cost is higher as the teacher increases the mastery class-
room structure.7 The optimal student’s effort is e∗(s) = min {γ + (θ − γ)s, 1}. Solving
maxs∈[0,1] θe∗(s)s− c(1− s) gives
s∗c =

1 if θ ≤ γ−
√
γ2−8c
4
c/θ+γ
2(γ−θ) if
γ−
√
γ2−8c
4
≤ θ ≤ γ+
√
γ2−8c
4
1 if θ ≥ γ+
√
γ2−8c
4
7One could replace the 1 in c(1− f) by any positive number higher than 1 without altering the result.
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It is represented in Figure 5 for γ = 1 and c = 0.025. Not surprisingly, the teacher chooses
a more performance oriented structure than when there is no cost difference: s∗c ≥ s∗. More
interestingly, a performance classroom structure becomes the optimal policy for (very) low-
ability students. A multiple goal structure would induce a higher effort for these students.
Yet from the teacher’s point of view, the increase in performance would not compensate
for the increase in cost related to the multiple structure. Hence, the teacher is better off
promoting a performance goal structure.
Figure 5: Classroom structures under different cost structures
Up until now, we have focused on how a teacher, by choosing the classroom structure,
can accompany the student towards the test to help facilitate success. In other words, we
have dealt with the management of motivation over the short run. However, the choice of
the classroom structure also affects the way a student reacts to the test result, most notably
when he has failed. To study the management of student motivation over the long run, we
introduce a dynamic (two-period) version of the model.
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4 Dynamic Management of Student Motivation
We consider a twice repeated version of the static model. We assume that a failure in the first
period affects the student’s attitude towards schooling in two ways: First, the probability
to succeed in the test of the second period decreases. This assumption may come from the
cumulative nature of knowledge, or alternatively, the failure may damage the student’s self-
confidence so that succeeding in the subsequent test becomes harder. Second, we assume that
the failure negatively affects student’s intrinsic motivation in the second period unless the
teacher chooses a classroom structure that is sufficiently mastery oriented in the first period.8
Hence, we treat the design of a mastery-oriented structure as a long-run investment in the
student’s intrinsic motivation. Within this framework, the teacher faces a trade-off between
promoting high grades in the short run through a performance structure, or permitting the
student’s to overcome a potential failure by implementing a mastery structure.
4.1 The Dynamic Model
There are two periods denoted by t = 1, 2. To concentrate on the dynamic issues, we focus
on a student with a balanced motivational propensity, γ1 = 1, and we consider the range
of ability levels for which a pure performance structure is optimal in the static framework,
θ ≥ 1/2.
The student. At period t, the student exerts an effort et. We denote by Xt the random
variable equal to 1 if the test in period t is successful and 0 otherwise.
The teacher. She chooses a classroom structure st ∈ [0, 1]. As before, a higher st means
that the structure is more performance-goal oriented. A smaller st means that the structure
is more mastery-goal oriented. The teacher’s payoff function for period t only depends on
8In educational psychology, there is a vast body of empirical evidence supporting the idea that, after a
failure, performance-goal oriented students report more negative self-related thoughts and less interest for
the learning task than mastery-goal oriented students (for example Dweck and Legett, 1988).
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the expected test result in this period, E(Xt|ht), where ht is the history of the game at the
beginning of period t.
Test result. For period one, we take
X1 =
 1 with probability θe1s10 with probability 1− θe1s1 (9)
We assume that the probability is unchanged after a success but negatively affected after a
failure: If the realized value of X1, is equal to 1, then
X2 =
 1 with probability θe2s20 with probability 1− θe2s2 (10)
However if the realized value of X1 is equal to 0 then
X2 =
 1 with probability
θe2s2
2
0 with probability 1− θe2s2
2
(11)
Propensity for intrinsic motivation. We assume that the intrinsic motivation is unaf-
fected after a success: γ2(1) = 1. Nonetheless, after a failure in period one, the propensity for
intrinsic motivation in period two depends on the classroom structure chosen by the teacher
in the first period. We have:
γ2(0) =
 1 if s1 ≤ ŝ0 if s1 > ŝ
for a given ŝ < 1. In other words the teacher can preserve the intrinsic motivation of the
student in period two after a failure by choosing a classroom structure sufficiently oriented
towards the mastery goals in the first period. Otherwise, the intrinsic motivation vanishes.
Payoffs. The student is risk neutral. His expected payoff in period t after the history ht is
E(Xt|ht) + γt(ht)et(1− st)− 0.5e2t (12)
We have h1 = ∅, h2 ∈ {0, 1} and by assumption, γ1(h1) = 1 . We assume that the total
payoff of the student is the discounted sum of his per-period payoffs. Let δp denote his
discount factor.
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The teacher’s expected payoff in period t is E(Xt|ht). We assume that the total payoff of the
teacher is the discounted sum of her per-period payoffs. Let δt denote her discount factor.
Timing of the game and strategies. At each period t = 1, 2,
- The teacher chooses a classroom structure st ∈ [0, 1] .
- The student observes st and exerts an effort level et ∈ [0, 1].
- The teacher and the student observe the realized value of Xt.
Strategies are s1, s2(1) s2(0) for the teacher and e1, e2(1, s2) and e2(0, s2) for the student.
4.2 The Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
We solve the second period (sub)game following a classroom structure s1 and an effort e1.
We determine student’s effort and teacher’s choice of classroom structure conditionally to
the test result of period one.
Suppose the student is successful, X1 = 1, then we have
e∗2(1, s2) = (θ − 1)s2 + 1 (13)
and
s∗2(1) = 1 (14)
This follows from expressions (4) and (6) and θ ≥ γ1/2 = 1/2. After a success in period
one, the probability of the student passing the test is sufficiently high to justify that the
teacher chooses a performance goal structure in period two. From Table 1, we know that at
equilibrium, the (expected) payoff for the student in period two is Up
∗
2 (1) = θ
2/2 and the
expected payoff for the teacher is U t
∗
2 (1) = θ
2.
Suppose the student fails the test in period one, X1 = 0. His probability of success in period
two decreases. We consider two cases:
(i) s1 > ŝ: the teacher favors a performance goal structure in period one. In this case, the
intrinsic motivation of the student totally vanishes after the failure: γ2(0) = 0. The student
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chooses an effort level e∗2(0, s2) = θs2/2 and the teacher chooses the classroom structure
s∗2(0) = 1. In period two, a performance structure is the best way to motivate a student
who has lost his intrinsic interest for learning. At equilibrium, the payoff for the student in
period two is Up
∗
2 (0) = θ
2/8 and the payoff for the teacher is U t
∗
2 (0) = θ
2/4.
(ii) s1 ≤ ŝ: in period one the teacher favors a classroom structure sufficiently oriented
towards mastery goals in order for the student to preserve his intrinsic motivation after
the failure: γ2(0) = 1. The student chooses an effort level e
∗
2(0, s2) = (θ/2 − 1)s2 + 1 and
the teacher chooses the classroom structure s∗2(0) =
1
2
1
1−θ/2 . In this case, by establishing
a multiple goal structure in period two, the teacher can build on the preserved intrinsic
motivation of the student to induce effort. The equilibrium payoff for the student in period
two is Up
∗
2 (0) = 1/8. The payoff for the teacher is U
t∗
2 (0) =
1
4
θ/2
1−θ/2 .
We solve period one knowing e∗2(.) and s
∗
2(.). For a given classroom structure s1, the student
maximizes:
θe1s1 + e1(1− s1)− 1
2
e21 + (θe1s1)δ
pUp∗2 (1) + (1− θe1s1)δpUp∗2 (0) (15)
We obtain:
e∗1(s1) =

1 + (θ − 1)s1 + (θs1)δp(θ
2
2
− θ
2
8
) if s1 > ŝ
1 + (θ − 1)s1 + (θs1)δp(θ
2
2
− 1
8
) if s1 ≤ ŝ
(16)
In period one, the student provides more effort in the dynamic model than in the static
framework. This supplementary effort is higher for a more patient student. Indeed, the
existence of the second period extends the benefits of being successful in the first period, as
the student’s capacity to succeed the second test depends on his initial performance.
The teacher chooses s∗1 to maximize the discounted sum of her per-period payoffs:
θe∗1(s1)s1 + (θe
∗
1(s1)s1)× δtU t
∗
2 (1) + (1− θe∗1(s1)s1)× δtU t
∗
2 (0) (17)
where e∗1(s1) is given by (16). Two policies are potentially optimal: s
∗
1 = 1 and s
∗
1 = ŝ.
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The total expected payoff of the teacher when she chooses s∗1 = 1 is
θ(θ +
3
8
δpθ3)(1 +
3
4
δtθ2) + δt
θ2
4
(18)
The total expected payoff when she chooses s∗1 = ŝ is(
θ(θŝ+ 1− ŝ+ θŝδp4θ
2 − 1
8
)ŝ
)(
1 + δt(θ2 − 1
4
θ
2− θ )
)
+
1
4
δt
θ
2− θ (19)
We denote by s˜(θ) the particular value of ŝ that equalizes (18) and (19). The determinant
of the corresponding second degree equation is
∆ = 1− 4(1− θ − θ4θ
2 − 1
8
δp)(θ + η)
with
η = −8δ
t(1− θ2)(1− θ)2 − 3δp(4 + 3δtθ2)(2− θ)θ3
32(2− θ) + δt(32θ2(2− θ)− 8θ)
We first consider the case where the discount factor of the student is nil, δp = 0. Here, the
determinant ∆ is positive.9 We find
s˜(θ) =
1−√∆
2(1− θ)
When s˜(θ) is below (above) ŝ, the structure ŝ yields the teacher a higher (lower) payoff than
s˜(θ); as a result, the teacher prefers the structure s1 = ŝ (s1 = 1) than the structure s1 = 1
(s1 = ŝ). Consequently, the optimal classroom structure chosen by the teacher in period one
for a given ability θ and structure ŝ is
s∗1 =
 1 if ŝ < s˜(θ)ŝ if ŝ ≥ s˜(θ)
The function s˜(θ) is represented in figure 5 for δt = 1. The lower the ability, θ, the larger
the area in which the teacher chooses the multiple goal structure, ŝ, in the first period.
By promoting both mastery and performance goals, the teacher accepts that the student
performs less well in the first period in order for him to be able to overcome a possible failure.
The choice of the multiple goal structure, ŝ, is however less appropriate for a high-ability
9This comes from the fact that η < 0 implies 4(1− θ − θ 4θ2−18 δs)(θ + η) < 4(1− θ)(θ) ≤ 1.
23
student for two reasons: First, it induces a significant decrease in the expected grade in the
first period compared to the situation with a performance structure. Second, the probability
of passing the test is larger for a high-ability student, thereby reducing the teacher’s benefit
for developing the student’s failure tolerance.
Note that s˜(θ) increases as δt decreases and that s˜(θ) = 1 for any θ when δt = 0:10 As the
teacher becomes less forward looking, he is less willing to sacrifice the student’s performance
in the first period and hence to develop his failure tolerance.
Figure 6: The threshold values
We now study the effect of increasing δp starting from zero for a given positive value of δt.
We have
s˜(θ) =
1−√∆
2(1− θ − θδp 4θ2−1
8
)
One can verify that s˜(θ) is increasing in δp.11 A more patient student exerts a higher level of
effort in period one in order to successfully enter period two. Nevertheless, the extra effort
is smaller when the structure is more mastery oriented in period one, because the student is
then more “insured” against failure. For this reason, developing a multiple goal structure in
the first period becomes less interesting for the teacher because it diminishes the student’s
incentives to exert effort in this period. One can even verify that s˜(θ) does not exist when
10When δt increases, γ decreases. In turn, ∆ increases and f(θ) decreases.
11Note that η is increasing in δs and that ∆ is positive as long as η ≤ 0.
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δp is above 0.56. In this case the teacher chooses a pure performance goal structure and we
are back to the results of the static case. We sum up the results in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 In a dynamic context, the teacher, if sufficiently patient, chooses a first-
period goal structure more mastery-oriented than in the static case, if the student is not too
patient. This choice of structure permits the teacher to develop the failure tolerance of the
student at the cost of a short run decrease in performance.
This result corresponds to the idea of the achievement goal literature which states that
by choosing a multiple goal structure, the teacher uses performance to spur an efficient
effort in the short run and mastery to increase student’s failure tolerance in the long run
(Ames, 1992; Barron and Harackiewicz, 2001). However, the previous proposition also shows
that multiple goal structures are less effective when students are more patient. Individuals’
time preferences for the future tend to increase during childhood and adolescence, thus
mastery goals are likely to be more useful for younger students in order to develop their
long-term motivation. Hence, a student’s stage of development may be an important variable
moderating the effects of goals on motivation and performance.
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5 Conclusion
This article studies the microeconomic foundations of student motivation in schools. Motiva-
tion is important to understand, as it is the underlying mechanism of students’ effort and an
influential factor in their performance. We focus on the use of the correct pedagogical policy,
or more precisely the correct classroom structure as an important instrument for balancing
the intrinsic and extrinsic motivational factors to help keep the students on track.
The model indicates that extrinsic rewards such as grades work well for high-ability
students. Even so, for low- or intermediate-ability students, educators cannot solely rely on
extrinsic rewards to foster performance, even in an accountability context. Faced with such
students, the teacher should choose a classroom structure more oriented towards mastery. In
doing so, the teacher is able to : (i) induce effort by developing student interest for the task,
(ii) hinder these students from adopting an avoidance behavior and keep them participating
in the classroom activities, (iii) motivate these students when they are risk averse by focusing
less on the test result, and (iv) develop their capacity to overcome failure by maintaining
their self-confidence over time.
These results suggest that in many cases economists should listen to educational psy-
chologists: Psychologists have long advocated mastery goals or multiple goals to secure a
stable motivation for a wide range of students in the educational system. On the other hand,
economists have often neglected some of the students’ motivational factors by only promoting
pro-competitive learning environments. This could result in situations where only a small
range of students are motivated to exert effort. Our work is a first step in clarifying the
various circumstances under which the different types of classroom structures are beneficial
to students. It could be interesting to extend the model to include informational asymme-
tries between the teacher and the student, or to go beyond the representative student by
considering a classroom with heterogeneous students.
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